项目来源

德国科学基金(DFG)

项目主持人

Hong Yu Wong

项目受资助机构

未公开

立项年度

2024

立项时间

未公开

项目编号

541025663

项目级别

国家级

研究期限

未知 / 未知

受资助金额

未知

学科

Practical Philosophy;Theoretical Philosophy

学科代码

未公开

基金类别

Research Grants

关键词

未公开

参与者

Claudio Tennie；Klaus Corcilius

参与机构

未公开

项目标书摘要：e there primitive actions-behaviour which is agentive,but which does not derive from the agent’s reasons?Tyler Burge(2009)and Helen Steward(2009a,2012)have argued that certain examples of animal actions fall into this category.This question is of great significance for the philosophy of action,which has focused on how action is rational behaviour that derives from reason and reflection.Most discussions focus on acting on the basis of reasons-in particular,on how reasons explain actions.Almost all theories of action nowadays derive from the Anscombean or Davidsonian traditions which agree that reason is essential to action.The case of primitive agency is thus striking in challenging the core tenet of reasons being necessary for action.The existence of primitive actions would thus require a reorientation of the philosophy of action-with implications for key questions,such as whether a theory of action that is equally applicable to human and non-human animal action is possible.In light of this,we urgently need a systematic analysis of primitive action that would address the question of what primitive action is-in light of existing accounts of animal agency from action theory,animal behaviour research,and evolutionary theory.With primitive agency in mind,we need to re-examine the foundations of action theory,especially with respect to our understanding of the relation between reason and action and with respect to our understanding of the distinction between activity and passivity.Finally,we can draw on what we learn from primitive agency and apply this to understanding animal agency and artificial agency.This project(PrimAct)proposes to study primitive agency systematically,to reflect on its significance for action theory more generally,and to explore applications of a theory of primitive agency.Primitive agency has the potential to transform our understanding of the nature of agency.

Application Abstract: Are there primitive actions-behaviour which is agentive,but which does not derive from the agent’s reasons?Tyler Burge(2009)and Helen Steward(2009a,2012)have argued that certain examples of animal actions fall into this category.This question is of great significance for the philosophy of action,which has focused on how action is rational behaviour that derives from reason and reflection.Most discussions focus on acting on the basis of reasons-in particular,on how reasons explain actions.Almost all theories of action nowadays derive from the Anscombean or Davidsonian traditions which agree that reason is essential to action.The case of primitive agency is thus striking in challenging the core tenet of reasons being necessary for action.The existence of primitive actions would thus require a reorientation of the philosophy of action-with implications for key questions,such as whether a theory of action that is equally applicable to human and non-human animal action is possible.In light of this,we urgently need a systematic analysis of primitive action that would address the question of what primitive action is-in light of existing accounts of animal agency from action theory,animal behaviour research,and evolutionary theory.With primitive agency in mind,we need to re-examine the foundations of action theory,especially with respect to our understanding of the relation between reason and action and with respect to our understanding of the distinction between activity and passivity.Finally,we can draw on what we learn from primitive agency and apply this to understanding animal agency and artificial agency.This project(PrimAct)proposes to study primitive agency systematically,to reflect on its significance for action theory more generally,and to explore applications of a theory of primitive agency.Primitive agency has the potential to transform our understanding of the nature of agency.